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Book Reviews
SuPPiESSION. By Leonard W. Levy. Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, 1960. 353 pp. $6.50.

LEGACY OF

The common law criminal offense known as seditious libel consisted essentially of criticizing the government. Any comment which
tended, in the opinion of the government, to lower the government,
its laws, officers, or policies in the public esteem subjected the speaker
or writer to prosecution. In modem times it has been freely asserted
that it was the purpose of the first amendment to abolish the common law of seditious libel. Justice Holmes declared in Abrams v.
United States, "I wholly disagree with the argument . . . that the
First Amendment left the common law as to seditious libel in force.
History seems to me against the notion."' Professor Zechariah Chafee,
Jr. wrote that "The First Amendment was written by men . . . who
intended to wipe out the common law of sedition, and make further
prosecutions for criticism of the government, without any incitement
to law-breaking, forever impossible in the United States of America."2
Now comes Leonard Levy to demonstrate that these statements
are historically invalid. The author is Dean of the Graduate School
of Arts and Sciences and Professor of American Constitutional Studies
at Brandeis University. He is the author of the useful work, The
Law of the Commonwealth and Chief Justice Shaw. Dean Levy
meticulously examines the views of every libertarian theorist and
writer, British and American, from the time of Milton through the
presidency of Jefferson. On the operating level, he summarizes the
experience involving prosecutions for seditious libel in the American colonies before independence and in the states to the early 1800's.
The conclusions at which he arrives are best set forth in his own words:
This book presents a revisionist interpretation of the origins and
original understanding of the First Amendment's clause of freedom
of speech and press. I have been reluctantly forced to conclude that
the generation which adopted the Constitution and the Bill of Rights
did not believe in a broad scope for freedom of expression, particularly in the realm of politics.
I find that libertarian theory from the time of Milton to the
ratification of the First Amendment substantially accepted the right
1250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). Justices Black and Douglas have also stated:
"But the First Amendment repudiated seditious libel for this country." Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 272 (1951).
2 Chafee, Free Speech in the United States, p. 21. (1948).
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of the state to suppress seditious libel. I find also that the American
experience with freedom of political expression was as slight as the
theoretical inheritance was narrow. Indeed, the American legislatures, especially during the colonial period, were far more oppressive than the supposedly tyrannous common-law courts. The evidence
drawn particularly from the period 1776 to 1791 indicates that the
generation that framed the first state declarations of rights and the
First Amendment was hardly as libertarian as we have traditionally
assumed. They did not intend to give free reign to criticism of the
government that might be deemed seditious libel, although the concept of seditious libel was-and still is-the principal basis of muzzling
political dissent. There is even reason to believe that the Bill of
Eights was more the chance product of political expediency on all
sides than of principled commitment to personal liberties. A broad
libertarian theory of freedom of speech and press did not emerge
in the United States until the Jeffersonians, when a minority party,
were forced to defend themselves against the Federalist Sedition
Act of 1798. In power, however, the Jeffersonians were not much
more tolerant of their political critics than the Federalists had been.

This book prompts the question: if Dean Levy is right, how could
Holmes and Chafee have been so wrong? More broadly, how many

other accepted versions of history are equally as unfounded as the
one Dean Levy disproves? Obviously, no answers are possible. A
related question is: how does one choose between contradictory views
and interpretations, each advanced by (presumably) experts? Clearly
it is impossible for anyone to research all the questions himself.
Here the answer seems to be to accept the expert whose views best
substantiate one's own policy choices.
Dean Levy's book also raises the question of the relevance, in
constitutional construction, of the original intent of the Framers. It

seems fair to say that original intent will always be exalted by the
proponents of any current policy when it supports them, but that it
will be finessed one way or the other when it does not. Similarly,
the opponents of any proposed policy will always argue that it violates
original intent and subverts the foundations of the Republic.
Dean Levy in his preface (p. viii) says: "This has been a difficult book to write, because the facts have dictated conclusions that
violate my predilections and clash with the accepted version of history. But just as my personal preferences as to current policy do not
depend on what passed for wisdom in the eighteenth century, my
views as a scholar do not depend on my civic convictions nor on historical convention." And he ends his book with these sentences
(p. 309): "But there is no evidence to warrant the belief, nor is there
valid cause or need to believe, that the Framers possessed the ultimate wisdom and best insights on the meaning of freedom of expression. It is enough that they gave constitutional recognition to the
principle of freedom of speech and press in unqualified and undefined
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terms. That they were Blackstonians does not mean that we cannot
be Brandeisians."
Dean Levy cannot complain, therefore, if the following prediction proves to be correct. Future civil libertarians will continue to
quote Holmes and Chafee and then, to demonstrate their objectivity
3
and their mastery of the materials, will add a footnote.
William P. Murphy*
Tim EcoNoMIcs OF REAL NoPR'T. By Ralph Turvel. Allan & Unwin,
Ltd., London, 1957. 148 pp.
One of the secrets of the superiority of our modern standard of
living over that of past centuries is the increased division of laborthe use of specialists. This applies to all types of production and at
all levels of functional operation in society. Thus, for example, there
is a division of labor between the decision-makers in government
and business (usually called executives, administrators, planners,
co-orlinators, commissioners, etc.) and those who provide the information as to "what, when, why and how" (usually called scientists-physical and social). The decision-maker operates with a general sense of the situation, a knowledge of alternative actions available, and an idea of goals, aims and purposes. He depends upon
scientists to constantly clarify the situation and to provide information and reasoning. He must balance and coordinate the various
scientific opinions relevant to the specific problem, relate the result
to his values and to other relevant considerations, and make his
decisions. The decision-maker and the scientist both need each other
-whether this relationship is consciously formalized by organization
or not. An effectively functioning society requires that they be able
to work together. Thus, it requires that they overcome the barriers to
communication set up by specialization and professionalization.
Mr. Turvey, who is a reader in economics at the University of
London and one of the ablest young British economists of our day,
has written this book on the economics of real property in order to
aid the "people concerned with real estate problems, such as valuers
and to vn planners" (p. vii). While the author would not argue that
economics is the only study worth considering when dealing with
such problems, he justifiably feels that many recent "expert commission" reports apparently ignore what economics may contribute
3 But see Levy, Legacy of Suppression (1960).
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Kentucky; Professor of Law, University of Mississippi.

